Kargil Vijay Diwas India 20th Anniversary Celebration in Hindi full information, Vijay Diwas image & Video..
Today, 20 years of Kargil victory day is over. India won the Kargil war on July 26, 1999, due to this, the Kargil Victory Day is celebrated every year on 26th July. In the history of Indo-Pak relations 1999 came in the form of that year when the bus diplomacy on the Wagah border turned towards Kargil war in three months. The then Army Chief, General Ved Prakash Malik, who has now retired and resides in Panchkula, has mentioned Ramesh Vinayak with what he has learned from the war in these 20 years. So let's read some interesting excerpts of an independent conversation with General (Retired) VP Malik.
How did Kargil conflict affect India's defense theory as a limited traditional war? When neighboring countries became a nuclear prosperous nation, then at that time people used to think that nuclear war (traditional war) is no longer possible. In fact it was the cause of the Lahore Manifesto in February 1999. But after the Kargil war, it became clear that apart from the nuclear war, there is a scope for war. We could not go for an all-out war, but a limited nuclear war was possible. Now both India and Pakistan are quite ready to fight. I hope they will not do this now.
Is India now better prepared than 1999?
Undoubtedly. Geopolitics and geo-strategic mobility change. In the 1990s, we shifted the 8th Division from this region (Kargil) to Kashmir. Another brigade was shifted to the valley. Now everything was empty. After the war, we did the first thing to fill those gap. 8 Mountain Division participating in the war are still stationed in that area. After 1999, we brought the 14th Corps in Leh to take care of the LoC from Lochzong to Loch, from JoJji La to Siachen, which relieves Srinagar-based 15th Corps, which is engaged in anti-rebel grid. The third and most important thing is that our weapons and equipment have improved, especially in surveillance equipment. Road networks and housing for soldiers in the snowy areas have become better.
There is a sharp debate on the number of 527 soldiers killed in Kargil
This was the result of two factors. First, the political objective was given to the Armed Forces that Pakistani intruders had to disperse without crossing the LOC. We had to face challenges like a difficult terrain, lack of intelligence and poor monitoring. We faced a large number of casualties between May 5 and May 21 when the infiltration was detected in Batalik. Initially, high-level intruders were considered 'Mujahideen' (militant) on our side of the LoC. That is why the soldiers who went inside and they did the job of retreating them. They followed the rules of the same strategy and engagement which they usually do in anti-terrorist operations in the valley. But on May 21, it became clear that they were Pakistani. When I informed the Cabinet Committee on Security matters that we are not against the militants but against the enemy and said that all three (Army, Air Force and Navy) need to work together. Then the whole thing changed.
How did the diplomatic push behind the scenes of New Delhi helped?
Kargil was a mixture of military, political and diplomatic victories. At one level, I told the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, let's assume that we can not infiltrate here, then we have to cross the border from somewhere else. What will be your answer? ' He understood Soon after, National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra told the television channels that crossing the border today is not good, we do not know about tomorrow. Meanwhile our military strategy was working. On other fronts the army took over the command and the rest came in the form of a strike on the other western border. The navy had shifted its fleet to the Arabian Sea. The Air Force had also acted. When Mishra met with his American counterpart Sandy Berger in Paris in mid-June, he told them, "Look, we can not keep our armed forces tied to the rope." Berger took that message to the United States President Bill Clinton. Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had gone to China for the first time but he did not get any support. When he went to America and met Clinton on July 4, he was in panic. On the same day, our army captured Tiger Hill. Now the situation was out of hand.
The Kargil Review Committee led by Subrahmanyam had made recommendations, how much did it apply? Many of them have been implemented, but not in the spirit in which they were recommended. Some important recommendations have not been implemented. For example, the Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS) has not been done even after the Cabinet approved years ago. This is affecting our military strategy. They did not integrate the Ministry of Defense. There is still the atmosphere of civil versus military in the ministry. Therefore, whenever it comes to the management of the army and the budget, some problems arise.
What is your Kargil memory?
It's a mixture of Happy and Sad memories. Whether I was meeting with politicians or bureaucrats or my colleagues in South Block, I found all the sad and shocked faces. There were some questions, everyone was walking in mind that it would not be that. Initially, morale was weak. But every time I went to the war zone, on almost every sixth day, I had never seen that kind of mood. Despite the casualties, the morale was high. My officers used to say to me, "Do not worry, sir, we will do it, my attitude towards the positive attitude, bravery and the sacrifice I witnessed increased my belief that we will beat Pakistan. Second memory meet young soldiers About that, many of whom are not.I remember that after Captain Vikram Batra patched and captured Point 5140, giving him a bottle of Scotch. Prahlad got PVC.
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Today, 20 years of Kargil victory day is over. India won the Kargil war on July 26, 1999, due to this, the Kargil Victory Day is celebrated every year on 26th July. In the history of Indo-Pak relations 1999 came in the form of that year when the bus diplomacy on the Wagah border turned towards Kargil war in three months. The then Army Chief, General Ved Prakash Malik, who has now retired and resides in Panchkula, has mentioned Ramesh Vinayak with what he has learned from the war in these 20 years. So let's read some interesting excerpts of an independent conversation with General (Retired) VP Malik.
How did Kargil conflict affect India's defense theory as a limited traditional war? When neighboring countries became a nuclear prosperous nation, then at that time people used to think that nuclear war (traditional war) is no longer possible. In fact it was the cause of the Lahore Manifesto in February 1999. But after the Kargil war, it became clear that apart from the nuclear war, there is a scope for war. We could not go for an all-out war, but a limited nuclear war was possible. Now both India and Pakistan are quite ready to fight. I hope they will not do this now.
Is India now better prepared than 1999?
Undoubtedly. Geopolitics and geo-strategic mobility change. In the 1990s, we shifted the 8th Division from this region (Kargil) to Kashmir. Another brigade was shifted to the valley. Now everything was empty. After the war, we did the first thing to fill those gap. 8 Mountain Division participating in the war are still stationed in that area. After 1999, we brought the 14th Corps in Leh to take care of the LoC from Lochzong to Loch, from JoJji La to Siachen, which relieves Srinagar-based 15th Corps, which is engaged in anti-rebel grid. The third and most important thing is that our weapons and equipment have improved, especially in surveillance equipment. Road networks and housing for soldiers in the snowy areas have become better.
There is a sharp debate on the number of 527 soldiers killed in Kargil
This was the result of two factors. First, the political objective was given to the Armed Forces that Pakistani intruders had to disperse without crossing the LOC. We had to face challenges like a difficult terrain, lack of intelligence and poor monitoring. We faced a large number of casualties between May 5 and May 21 when the infiltration was detected in Batalik. Initially, high-level intruders were considered 'Mujahideen' (militant) on our side of the LoC. That is why the soldiers who went inside and they did the job of retreating them. They followed the rules of the same strategy and engagement which they usually do in anti-terrorist operations in the valley. But on May 21, it became clear that they were Pakistani. When I informed the Cabinet Committee on Security matters that we are not against the militants but against the enemy and said that all three (Army, Air Force and Navy) need to work together. Then the whole thing changed.
How did the diplomatic push behind the scenes of New Delhi helped?
Kargil was a mixture of military, political and diplomatic victories. At one level, I told the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, let's assume that we can not infiltrate here, then we have to cross the border from somewhere else. What will be your answer? ' He understood Soon after, National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra told the television channels that crossing the border today is not good, we do not know about tomorrow. Meanwhile our military strategy was working. On other fronts the army took over the command and the rest came in the form of a strike on the other western border. The navy had shifted its fleet to the Arabian Sea. The Air Force had also acted. When Mishra met with his American counterpart Sandy Berger in Paris in mid-June, he told them, "Look, we can not keep our armed forces tied to the rope." Berger took that message to the United States President Bill Clinton. Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had gone to China for the first time but he did not get any support. When he went to America and met Clinton on July 4, he was in panic. On the same day, our army captured Tiger Hill. Now the situation was out of hand.
The Kargil Review Committee led by Subrahmanyam had made recommendations, how much did it apply? Many of them have been implemented, but not in the spirit in which they were recommended. Some important recommendations have not been implemented. For example, the Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS) has not been done even after the Cabinet approved years ago. This is affecting our military strategy. They did not integrate the Ministry of Defense. There is still the atmosphere of civil versus military in the ministry. Therefore, whenever it comes to the management of the army and the budget, some problems arise.
What is your Kargil memory?
It's a mixture of Happy and Sad memories. Whether I was meeting with politicians or bureaucrats or my colleagues in South Block, I found all the sad and shocked faces. There were some questions, everyone was walking in mind that it would not be that. Initially, morale was weak. But every time I went to the war zone, on almost every sixth day, I had never seen that kind of mood. Despite the casualties, the morale was high. My officers used to say to me, "Do not worry, sir, we will do it, my attitude towards the positive attitude, bravery and the sacrifice I witnessed increased my belief that we will beat Pakistan. Second memory meet young soldiers About that, many of whom are not.I remember that after Captain Vikram Batra patched and captured Point 5140, giving him a bottle of Scotch. Prahlad got PVC.
More News Click Here
#KargilVijayDiwas #VijayDiwasFact #Indianews #IndiaToday #VijayDiwasImage
